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Abstract—In the modern power grid operation, the 
regulatory goal of the market is to provide continuous 
electricity supply to the customers with reasonable energy 
prices. The current structure of energy market in Malaysia 
follows the single buyer market model, where the generation is 
procured solely by a single utility with a limited competition, 
which is not effective in lowering the electricity prices.  This 
paper proposes a market framework for competitive strategies 
to achieve maximum benefits of the power grid in Sarawak,
Malaysia while the optimal bidding in the day-ahead market is 
assessed. Game theory with the non-cooperative scheme is 
applied for the electricity market comprising various 
participants. The performance of the proposed approach is 
evaluated using a practical power grid with data of the 
electricity market obtained from available sources. The 
feasibility of electricity market deregulation in Sarawak is 
proven to be effective, as the proposed framework can provide 
insight into the generated revenue of energy producers in a fair 
and competitive market environment. 
Keywords—electricity market, bidding optimization, energy 
monopolies, restructuring of power industry 
I. INTRODUCTION
The electricity industry in many countries has shifted 
from a monopolized market to a deregulated market. Chile is 
regarded as the first country to introduce major restructuring 
in the country’s electricity market in 1982. In the late 1980s, 
England and Wales followed suit with a massive 
privatization scheme, and some power plants started to be 
privatized from 1990 to 1991. The electricity market was 
based on the idea of energy as a commodity, and thus as 
stated by some economists, the monopoly of any electric 
utility or power generation company removed the initiative 
of efficient operation that resulted in higher electricity 
prices. The advantage of a deregulated electricity market is 
that the market becomes more competitive, abuse of market 
power will be reduced, lower and more stable electricity 
prices will be established as it would be closer to the 
marginal cost [1], [2], [3]. A typical electricity market 
consists of generation, transmission and distribution, and 
wholesale. The wholesale market usually exists as electricity 
pools or bilateral transactions. In a deregulated electricity 
market, the day-ahead market is operated by considering 
hourly bids and the amount of generation by individual 
generation companies (GC). The hourly generation and 
dispatch schedules are obtained from the GC bids. 
Customers submit offers to buy electricity, specifying the 
quantity and price. The market clearing price (MCP) is 
obtained from the point of intersection between the supply 
and demand curves. GC receive payment based on MCP for 
each MW and customers bidding to buy power and pay 
according to the MCP, irrespective of the bids and offers 
submitted. No matter what the structure of electricity market 
is, the ultimate goal for GC is to maximize profit and 
minimize risk; and for customers, it is to minimize electricity 
costs and achieve maximum savings [3], [4]. In the 
deregulated power grid, the dynamic pricing structures 
should realize the actual value of demand flexibility which 
has to be a part of electricity market integration [5].  
Malaysia’s electricity consumption per capita is showing 
a declining trend. Hence, it is crucial to create an affordable 
electricity market and decrease the number of people without 
access to electricity [6]. In Malaysia, consumers are only 
served by a single utility which is Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
(TNB) in Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak Energy Berhad in 
Sarawak, and Sabah Electricity Sdn. Bhd. in Sabah. Other 
than the implementation of a single buyer model which 
introduces some competition in the generating sector, the rest 
of the electricity supply structure remains monopolized. The 
demand for electricity in Peninsular Malaysia is expected to 
increase by 1.62% each year from 2016 to 2035 [7]. 
Accordingly, the cost of generation increases as demand 
increases because generators with higher operating costs are 
still utilized to fulfil the energy demand. Hence, it is unlikely 
for electricity prices to decrease unless power suppliers 
operate efficiently with the help of government to support the 
deregulation of electricity market. After the major blackout 
occurred in Peninsular Malaysia in 1992, the government 
introduced independent power producers (IPP) to the 
generation sector. In 1993, five companies were contracted 
to supply 30% of the electricity demand.  A Single buyer or 
monopsony is a situation where there is only one buyer. 
Here, the single buyer is responsible for energy procurement 
and scheduling generation dispatch while the system 
operator is responsible for grid system operation and real-
time dispatch. The ring-fencing of single buyer involves 
maintaining a separate account as well as separate operation 
to avoid conflict of interest or favoritism since it is still a 
part of TNB. The purpose of ring-fenced single buyer is to 
ensure transparency. The first phase of the new enhanced 
dispatch arrangement (NEDA) was implemented on 1st
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